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political geography that is rooted in the somewhat exceptionalIntroduction
Sami Moisio
This series of interventions is based on a panel discussion
organized in Turku, Finland, as part of the Nordic Geographers’
Meeting in 2009, where it was observed that the whole issue of
Nordic political geographies is a problematic yet interesting one
and that very little has been published on the topic e even though
scholarship in political geography has mushroomed in some of the
Nordic countries over the past fifteen years or so (Moisio & Harle,
2010; O’Loughlin, Raento, & Sidaway, 2008; Stokke & Sæther,
2010). Rather than present reviews of political geography in each
of the five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
and Sweden), each intervention cuts across national boundaries to
inquire how political geography e both as a practice and as an
academic disciplinee simultaneously characterizes and divides the
countries of the Nordic region.
The lead intervention is provided by Kristian Stokke and Elin
Sæther, whose essay is an important opening that forms the
backbone for our collection. The rest of the interventions more or
less explicitly comment on the issues that are taken up in their
paper. These “responses” act as a springboard for some concluding
remarks by the authors of the opening intervention.
In the ensuing pages we make a heuristic distinction between
three Nordic political geographies e which are of course entangled
and co-constituted. We first elaborate upon Nordic political geog-
raphy as a specific context that has not only been characterized byAll rights reserved.type of statehood. Secondly, we ask whether Nordic political
geography can be considered a distinct geopolitical tradition or
experience, and finally, Nordic political geography is dealt with as
a regional academic practice.
experience of Nordic countries that is often understood to be
characterized by a homogenous “Nordic model” of statehood. This
is an important theme given that the construction of a Nordic
political geography is problematic because it assumes the existence
of impermeable geographical borders of the kind that have long
been criticized by political geographers, and because the develop-
mental trajectories of what is today being called the Nordic welfare
state are country-specific. This theme is taken up in the Finnish
context by Sami Moisio, who both scrutinizes the apparent unity of
the Nordic region and makes some contextual remarks on the birth
of “Nordic statehood” in Finland in the form of a “cartel state”.
The second theme addressed by Stokke and Sæther is the
geopolitical specificity of the Nordic context. Even though the
“Nordic states” differ fundamentally in their geopolitical histories,
Nordic political geography can be looked on as the specific geopo-
litical experience or tradition of a “small-state”. Henrik Gutzon
Larsen asks whether being a small state could indeed be thought of
as a distinct orientation for the political geographies of the Nordic
states and describes how this “small-state geopolitics” is being
played out in the Danish and, to a lesser extent, Swedish contexts.
The third issue that is raised is the whole idea of the possibility
or meaningfulness of any type of regional political geography,
whether Anglo-American, European, Nordic or something else.
According to Stokke and Sæther, recent scholarship in the political
geography of the Nordic countries has been characterized by
internationalization rather than theoretical and methodological
regionalization. Following this line of thought, Richard Ek and
Anders Lund Hansen point out that, rather than participate in the
academic region-building and border construction that inevitably
involves processes of knowledge inclusion and exclusion, critical
scholars should be equipped to study regionalization processes
themselves.
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geography
Kristian Stokke and Elin Sæther
Is there a distinct Nordic political geography and what would be
its common denominator across national specificities and in
contrast to non-Nordic contexts? In this short intervention we will
focus on the role of one possible common ground, namely the so-
called ‘Nordic model’ of statehood. Has the existence of a shared,
but diversified, Nordic model of social democracy, welfare state,
mixed economies, small-state geopolitics and regional identity
given rise to region-specific Nordic political geographies? The
argument we will develop is that it is difficult to identify separate
theoretical and methodological approaches, but there are research
themes and perspectives that to some extent are context-specific
and related to the Nordic model. To support this argument we
will provide some introductory remarks about the politics of
political geography, outline basic commonalities and differences
within the Nordic model, and discuss the contents and prospects
for distinct Nordic political geographic practices.
Political geography is the study of power, politics and spatiality,
while at the same time being unavoidably embedded in the spati-
ality of power and politics. In agreement with this observation,
Herb (2008) argues that the history of political geography can be
understood through its politics as much as the genealogy of its core
concepts. More specifically, he argues that the state remains a locus
of engagement and identifies three ways of engaging with the state
within political geography: (i) to facilitate the process of maxi-
mizing the territorial power of the state; (ii) to assist in maintaining
and managing the power of the state, and; (iii) to resist and ques-
tion the spatial practices of the state. Seen through this ordering
framework, the history of political geography is one of competing
and changing modes of political engagement: (i) political advocacy
in support of nationalist territorial expansion, especially in the
context of imperial rivalry from the late 19th century; (ii)
a perceived neutral and scientific support for state building and
governance, especially in the positivist period of human geography
from the 1950s, and; (iii) critique of constellations and practices of
power, especially from the 1970s onwards.
Does this categorization of the politics of political geography
capture the history of political geography in the Nordic countries?
The ideological tradition in geopolitics had a strong presence in the
work of Rudolph Kjellén in Sweden and Gudmund Hatt in
Denmark, and can also be found in the role of the Norwegian and
Danish geographical societies in regard to territorial claims in the
Arctic and Antarctic (Holdar, 1992; Larsen, 2011). In contrast, there
was a striking absence of political geography within Nordic
universities during the heyday of positivist engagement with the
state, due to the disrepute of the ideological tradition and the lack
of rigorous scientific methods within political geography. Thus, the
links between political geography and the state were weak or
absent during the period that was marked by the construction of
the Nordic model and scholarly engagement in state governance.
This contrasts sharply with Nordic human geography and social
science in general, which have been marked by a strong tradition of
scholarship in support of state building. While political geography
has re-emerged in the Nordic countries since the 1980s, particularly
in the form of Finnish critical geopolitics, it can be argued that this
is more related to the international revitalisation of critical political
geography than to contextual political dynamics in the Nordic
region. Against this general background of changing and increas-
ingly critical engagement with the state, what is the meaning and
relevance of the Nordic model for the development of Nordic
political geography?The notion of a distinct ‘Nordic model’ has had a remarkably
stable presence in academic and political discourse. Presented in an
ideal typicalmanner, theNordicmodel is said to contain a handful of
key characteristics that are common across its contextual manifes-
tations (Hilson, 2008). First, it is often observed that the Nordic
states are marked by ‘consensual democracy’ in the sense that the
political system enjoys a high degree of legitimacy, the relations
between state, market and civil society are highly organized, social
divisions are relatively mild and political deliberations aim to
neutralize conflict and achieve compromise. The prominent posi-
tion of social democratic parties, high levels of political participation
and a tendency to favour neo-corporatist methods of decision-
making are central features of Nordic consensual democracies
(Berman, 2006). Second, the Nordic countries have been marked by
a successful combination of state regulation and market capitalism
that has yielded rapid economic growth and secured great affluence
since World War II. Following from these transformations, the
Nordic countries have come to be known for exceptionally high
standards of living. Third, the welfare state is also a defining feature
of the Nordic model, with comprehensive and universal welfare
programmes as an integral part of state management of the capi-
talist economy and as means for promoting both social equality and
economic efficiency (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
Fourth, the Nordic region as a geopolitical entity is also seen as an
integral dimension of the model, despite different international
interests and strategies. Being small powers located in a precarious
position between East and West during the Cold War, the Nordic
states are commonly assumed to share an interest in maintaining
peace, sometimes resulting in a role as mediators between larger
powers (see Henrik Gutzon Larsen’s contribution). The small-state
identity poses security challenges, but is also construed as a resource
for international influence as it is associated with a moral authority
that grants power through value diplomacy. Fifth, and finally, these
defining featuresof theNordicmodel areoften said to restona shared
regional identity. The group of Nordic states are assumed to share
a regional identity in cultural terms and as a security community,
despite obvious cultural diversity and the failure to institutionalize
Nordic security cooperation (see Moisio’s contribution).
Beyond these idealized commonalities, the Nordic region obvi-
ously contains a diversity of contextual institutional arrangements
and political dynamics. There are notable differences regarding
economic models, the character of the welfare state, the constel-
lations of political forces, models of democratic representation, and
foreign policies and security arrangements. The latter was strik-
ingly visible in the different strategies towards US- and Soviet-led
alliance politics during the Cold War. The Nordic states also
display very different foreign policies vis-á-vis post-Cold War
European integration, especially between the old and new
members of the European Union (Denmark, Sweden and Finland)
and those who, for now at least, are non-members (Norway and
Iceland). It can also be observed that although the Nordic states
have arrived at a form of statehood with shared general charac-
teristics, these are products of diverse political dynamics and
trajectories. This means that while it is possible and common to talk
of a Nordic model, it may be more accurate to describe it as “one
model with five exceptions” (Hilson, 2008: 113).
Finally, it must also be acknowledged that the Nordic model is
not static but undergoing general and contextual processes of
change due to both domestic and international dynamics. To take
one example, economic globalisation has obviously changed the
political space for states to pursue autonomous economic policies,
thereby challenging and transforming growth and welfare policies
within the Nordic model. Likewise, international migration chal-
lenges the assumed ethnic, linguistic and cultural homogeneity
that the Nordic model of social democracy and citizenship has been
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Nordic model is coming under pressures that transform the model
andmakes it less exceptional in an international context, while also
transforming the diversity among the Nordic states. For example,
the reality of multiculturalism has given rise to strict immigration
regulation in all the Nordic countries, but also quite different
politics of citizenship and integration, ranging from an emphasis on
assimilation in Denmark to a greater acceptance of multicultur-
alism in Sweden. It can thus be concluded that there is a persistent
sense of a shared Nordic model, but also contextual diversity and
changes within this model. What does this mean for the existence
and prospects for a distinct Nordic political geography?
Returning to the questions of whether there is, can be or should
be distinct Nordic political geographic practices, we will make two
main observations. On the one hand, we find it difficult to identify
a specific Nordic tradition in terms of theoretical and methodo-
logical approaches. The contemporary development of political
geography at Nordic universities has coincided with and been
inspired by the international revitalisation of political geography,
and has been marked by the importation of theories and method-
ologies rather than autonomous development of Nordic
approaches. Nordic human geography, like English language
international human geography in general, displays a critical focus
on power and broadly defined politics through a shared interna-
tional body of social and political theories. Internationalization
rather than theoretical and methodological regionalization is, in
our view, the foremost tendency in the contemporary development
of political and human geography in the Nordic countries (see also
the contribution by Richard Ek & Anders Lund Hansen).
On the other hand, contextual power constellations and political
dynamics have undeniably brought up research themes and prac-
tices that may be seen as distinctly Nordic. However, research on
Nordic social democracies, mixed economies, welfare states and
identities has been more prominent in other sub-disciplines of
Nordic human geography than in political geography. This can be
explained by the weak position of political geography during the
formative period of the Nordic model, but also by the technocratic
mode of engagement that made knowledge from economic, social
and urban geography instrumental to state planning for urban and
regional development. It can thus be observed that there is a body
of human geographic scholarship on the Nordic model, often done
in the service of state building and public administration. Such
state-supporting research activities display, however, a certain
political deficit in the sense that policy making tends to be handled
in a technocratic manner. The challenge is to make the politics of
the Nordic model and its continuous transformations into objects
of critical political geographic scholarship. There is an abundance of
under-researched themes for political geography emanating from
this, including the politics of regional identity, small-state geopol-
itics and political geographic practices, discussed in the contribu-
tions that follow below.
There are also examples of the Nordic context giving rise to
specific traditions of political geographic scholarship. The foremost
example of this is the recent development of critical geopolitics
among Finnish political geographers. Another example is found in
Norwegian political geography, where there is a strong focus on
politics in the Global South. Both fields are interrelated with
contextual political conditions and state policies. The focus on
politics and development among Norwegian political geographers
can, for example, be traced back to development studies linked to
Norwegian international engagement in peace and development. It
has, however, developed into critical political geographic scholar-
ship on contextual politics in the Global South, thereby deviating
from both development geography and the strong focus on
northern geopolitics in Anglo-American political geography. Thesebrief examples demonstrate that the Nordic model and context
may bring up distinct research themes to be addressed by Nordic
political geographers, even though there is relatively little basis for
claiming that there is a distinct Nordic political geography related
to this model.
Where does this leave Nordic political geography in strategic
terms? Our conclusion is that it is neither possible nor desirable to
mark off and essentialize a separate Nordic political geography.
However, there are important contextual dynamics in the Nordic
countries that deserve critical attention by political geographers
and that can enrich international debates and function as correc-
tives to ethnocentric universalism. The challenge for Nordic polit-
ical geographers is to negotiate a position between the assumed
universalism of imported approaches and the assumed exception-
alism of the Nordic region.
Rethinking Nordic unity and the Nordic model
Sami Moisio
This intervention inquires into the “Nordic context”, as
succinctly discussed by Kristian Stokke and Elin Sæther. The
authors suggest that the Nordic model is often understood as
indicating the existence of a distinct geopolitical entity, a kind of
Nordic region, which is characterized by “a shared identity” and
“common interests”. It is this often conceived Nordic unity that I
will discuss first in my intervention.
Stokke and Sæther single out three broad issues that are usually
conflated with the term “Nordic model”: a specific type of
consensual democracy, a combination of state socialism andmarket
capitalism, and the universality of welfare programmes as an
integral part of state management. They go on to remind us that
even though there may be a fairly clear understanding, or even
a “persistent sense of a shared Nordic model”, the Nordic context is
also characterized by “contextual diversity”, which should be
scrutinized from a critical perspective. In the latter part of this
intervention I shall take up the issue of “varieties of Nordicity” by
discussing the geopolitical specificity of the Nordic region and the
contextuality of the development of the welfare state that resulted
in the “Nordic model” in Finland.
The Nordic region (used here as a synonym for Norden) is
a geopolitical conceptwith ameaning that is dependent on political
processes, discourses and interpretations. Considered in terms of
the conceived “Nordic unity”, the concept is first and foremost
a child of the Cold War, the external image of a political space
consisting of Sweden (as its core), Norway, Denmark and perhaps to
a lesser extent Finland and Iceland. This external image was
construed around the issues of neutrality, peace and a lower level of
military tension than in Central Europe. In such a view “the Nordic
identity” represented “a model of the enlightened, anti-militaristic
society that was superior to the old Europe” (Wæver, 1992: 77).
From the 1960s onwards, the concept of the Nordic region came
to be associated with a specific form of state capitalism, involving
epithets such as “social democracy” and “the welfare state”, as
discussed by Stokke and Sæther. The “Nordic model” signified
a “third way” (not to be confused with the “third way” of Tony Blair
and his New Labour movement) between communism and capi-
talism during the Cold War (Wæver, 1992: 77; cf. Patomäki, 2000).
One may in fact argue that it was particularly the work of Gøsta
Esping-Andersen (1990: 27, 28) e published only two years
before the collapse of the Soviet Union e that forcefully concep-
tualized the “social democratic welfare-state regime”, character-
ized by a “solidaristic, universalistic and de-commodifying welfare
system”, as a distinct Nordic model. It is interesting, though, that
Esping-Andersen attributed the specific welfare-state regime to the
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may, the image of Nordic unity as being based on the Nordic model
as a specific “type” of statehood has been so powerful that
economic historians continue to discuss whether the phenomenon
called “Nordic capitalism” actually exists and often conclude that it
is possible to distinguish the Nordic model of capitalism from other
models (see Fellman et al., 2008).
The image of a united Nordic region was affirmed during the
ColdWar by establishing institutional structures such as the Nordic
Council (an inter-parliamentary body founded in 1952) and the
Nordic Council of Ministers (an inter-governmental body founded
in 1971). Both of these organizations are devoted to building up
Nordic cooperation on a cultural and linguistic basis, and they have
contributed greatly to the creation of an image of a unified cultural
and political regionwhere the vitality of this cooperation and unity
wells up from the deep structures of similar civil societies and
forms of statehood. Simultaneously, however, these organizations
epitomize the exclusionary nature of the concept of a Nordic region.
For instance, the many attempts by Estonian governments in the
late 1990s to represent Estonia as a Nordic country (see Ilves, 1999)
were largely rejected by the Nordic governments and their
institutions.
The differences in the constitutive elements of the Nordic region
are less often mentioned, however. Attempts to create a Scandina-
vian defence union after the Second World War failed, and since
then the Nordic states have adopted different security policy
models. Where Finland and Sweden have remained outside all
military alliances, Norway, Denmark and Iceland opted to join
NATO. It is similarly significant that attempts to create closer Nordic
economic cooperation (e.g. the Nordek initiative in the late 1960s)
have failed. As far as European integration is concerned, the Nordic
countries have rather dissimilar histories. Denmark (1973), Sweden
(1995) and Finland (1995) have become members of the European
Union, but have reached different decisions regarding monetary
policies (only Finland has adopted the Euro), while Norway is not
a member and Iceland applied for membership only in 2009.
Indeed, it seems fair to suggest that the difficulties in developing
Nordic cooperation within the EU from 1995 onwards, e.g. in the
name of the ‘Northern Dimension’, were not due to the rumoured
bitter relations between some of the Nordic prime ministers, but
rather to the distinct geopolitical cultures that exist within these
states. In short, European integration is valued, debated and
reasoned differently in the various Nordic countries, and the whole
concept of Europe is arguably being actualized differently in their
politics. A healthy sceptic would thus point out that the concept of
the Nordic region denotes as much regional disintegration as
integration and unity.
The paradox in the concepts of the Nordic region and the Nordic
model is that they conceal the quite distinct national histories and
political geographies of five states which have historically devel-
oped very differently. Class and regional cleavages have surfaced in
dissimilar ways, their political decisions have been motivated by
different perspectives on security issues, for instance, and the very
notion of “national survival” has been defined separately for each
country. I would like to suggest that it is partly because of these
distinct geopolitical histories, processes, experiences and traditions
(and the related geopolitical discourses and interpretations) that no
such thing as a common Nordic way of thinking, tradition or
research agenda in the field of political geography has ever evolved.
One may also draw attention to the use of the concept “Nordic”
in domestic politics. In such a view, the common denominator
throughout the Nordic region is that this concept has been
exploited in domestic political processes for decades. It has been
used in political arguments to legitimize certain actions and justify
specific political orientations. Again, this common theme disclosesat the same time the fact that distinct political use has beenmade of
the Nordic concept in these states, inescapably carrying place-
specific political meanings in different geographical contexts. In
Finland, for instance, the concept of the Nordic region gained
relevance in the spheres of geopolitics and identity politics prior to
the development of the Nordic model.
Even though it is almost axiomatic today to argue that Finland is
a “purely” western country because its political history and tradi-
tion hark back to a common history with Sweden (see Lipponen,
2008), this “western identity” has not been so self-evident in the
country’s history (see Kangas, 2011; Moisio, 2008). Historically
speaking, the meaning of the concept of the Nordic region has
nonetheless been bound up with identity politics, so that its usage
embodies the various historical attempts by political actors to
define the country’s geopolitical identity and location. This can be
illustrated with three examples.
Firstly, even though there was political resistance to the devel-
oping of closer political ties with the Scandinavian countries in the
1930s, cultural ties were actively represented in Finnish politics in
the 1930s and 1940s. The geopolitical relevance of the link with
Scandinavia was strengthened during the Second World War. The
basic character of these arguments was that they sought to distance
Finland from the cultural sphere of the Soviet Union by empha-
sizing its common cultural roots with Sweden and the rest of
Scandinavia. The attempts to move Finland closer to Scandinavia
from the mid-1940s onwards are today interpreted as efforts on the
part of the leading anti-communist forces in Finland to distinguish
Finland culturally from the Soviet bloc of people’s democracies and
associate it with a Nordic (or Scandinavian) reference group of
states (for an analysis, see Majander, 2004).
Secondly, strategic concepts such as “Nordic stability” repre-
sented important ideas relevant to the location of Finland on the
geopoliticalmapof Europe during theColdWar. The identity politics
role of the Nordic regionwas arguably strengthened during the Cold
War, given that it was associated with an important security policy
discourse of the time, that of neutrality. This fostered links between
the concept of the Nordic region and the country’s identity and
security politics.
Thirdly, the identity political dimension of the Nordic region
surfaced again in the early 1990s as part of Finland’s struggle
for membership in the EU. Some of the most visible opponents
of membership offered Nordic integration as an alternative to
European integration, arguing that the Nordic group of states was
a natural reference group for political cooperation, a geographical
setting that would prevent the inescapable geographical margin-
alization of Finland as a part of the EU. They also used the concept
of the Nordic model to demonstrate the dubious dominance
of “southern influences” in the EU. Interestingly, the strongest
proponents of membership argued that the Nordic cooperation that
was being suggested was illusory and that the Nordic emphasis did
not contain a sufficient identity political message for a state that
sought to prove its true western political legacy (Moisio, 2006).
The heyday of the Nordic region and the associated cooperation
in Finland was perhaps bound up with the times before EU
membership, and the significance of the Nordic region for Finland’s
identity policies has gradually declined from the mid-1990s
onwards, indicating that the processes of state and national
survival have been largely detached from it.
The development of the Nordic model in Finland is equally
contextual and country-specific. Any critical scholar would thus
point out that the development of what Esping-Andersen (1990)
later famously conceptualized as the social democratic welfare-
state regime differs in its political origins and geographies between
the Nordic countries. Applying the perspective of Painter and
Jeffrey (2009: 47), I would like to argue that the particular
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1960s and culminated in the 1980s, such as the principles of
regional and social equity, came first and the diagnosis that these
political innovations add up to an integrated, functional whole
called the Nordic welfare state followed only later. This is to say that
the development of the “Nordic model” in Finland was not so much
based on “Nordicity” (even though some of the policy models were
copied from Sweden) but rather on a specific governmental ratio-
nality that sought to foster the legitimacy of the state apparatus. In
other words, the political practices that constituted the welfare
state were ultimately about constituting what Deborah Cowen and
Neil Smith (2009) call “geopolitical social”. These practices were
part and parcel to the making of a national social order and society.
The making of this national society and its coupling with the
national territory served certain specific political ends.
I would like to argue that the construction of the “geopolitical
social” was in Finland based on a specific type of “cartel state”
which can be considered an alternative to the aggressive ideology
of competition. The development of this cartel state took place in
Finland in the 1960s and 1970s, ultimately based on the principle
that domestic competition e be it between social classes, institu-
tions, companies or placesewas pernicious from the perspective of
the national social order. Indeed, throughout what is today
understood as the construction of the Nordic model of statehood,
governments sought to chain free competition within the state by
allowing cartels in key economic sectors, for instance. These
cartels e which were finally banned in 1992 as the neoliberal
politics of competition reached Finlandewere of course developed
in order to regulate overproduction and to harmonize prices for the
needs of the export markets, but they should also be seen as
reflecting the wider societal development within the state. As the
historian Markku Kuisma (2010: 96, 117) succinctly argues, cartels
in Finland were part of the creation of a domestic societal order
which enabled the paper workers to “construct their detached
houses”, the state to construct schools and hospitals and elites to
“plan their next moves without being rushed”. The cartel state was
thus a “national coalition” within which political projects and
processes were first and foremost articulated in the name of
a national consensus and sense of integrity. This was epitomized by
the need of governments to influence the level of employment, for
instance, and to regulate demand through interventionist and
growth-oriented social policies from the late 1950s onwards. The
underlying idea was that strengthening the country on a national
scalewould not only contribute to economic growth but also lead to
political compromise (the “national consensus”) by overcoming
class differences.
The policy innovations that are connected with the Nordic
model in Finland today can thus be looked on as political strategies
which sought to minimize the risk of widespread social unrest,
which could potentially have led to the demise of the capitalist
economic system. In this context, leftist political radicalism was
regarded as the primary threat to state sovereignty and indepen-
dence, so that the maintenance of Finnish independence required
particular economic interventions that would increase the legiti-
macy of the state apparatus throughout the territory by producing
economic growth and welfare. The struggle against the spread of
communism in particular (both in urban areas and in the periph-
eries) and the construction of a spatially integrated state were thus
inherently interlinked. In summary, most of the projects that
territorialized state power in Finland from the early 1960s onwards
and which were later associated with the “Nordic model” were
motivated by a complex combination of security and economic
concerns, and were inherently informed by a peculiar type of
strategic thinking. This was first and foremost conditioned by the
peculiar presence of the Soviet Union in Finnish politics.As Stokke and Sæther remind us, the Nordic model, if there is
one, is not a static phenomenon. The recent emergence and
dominance of the discourse of a knowledge-based society and the
language and practices related to neoliberal competition policies in
Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Finland calls for a Nordic-
scale analysis, and an inquiry into the transformation of statehood
(and into the entire political debate on the future of the welfare
state) in a northern European context. This could not only add some
important insights to the rich literature on political geographies of
state transformation but also disclose key differences in how the
“Nordic model” is being transformed in different countries.
Small-state geopolitics
Henrik Gutzon Larsen
Some five years ago, and for once the finer details do not have to
be unpacked for an international audience, Denmark experienced
geopolitics e with a vengeance. I am referring to the so-called
‘cartoon crisis’, of course, which has already made its way into
several academic journals. Rather than yet another round in the
‘domestic’ politics of mounting ethnic nationalism and cultural
racism (Koefoed & Simonsen, 2007), a venomous blend of small-
state smugness and Islamophobia jumped scale, and seemingly
out of the blue, the government was embroiled in a fully-fledged
diplomatic crisis, while Danes more generally faced the unfa-
miliar spectacle of it being their flag that was burned in far-away
places. From the habitual self-image of being a paragon of virtue
in world politics, a small state but a moral great power, Danes too
were now faced with the question: ‘Why do they hate us?’. This
awakening to post-Cold War world politics, which in various ways
is shared by all the Nordic countries, has manifested itself in a range
of geopolitical practices, for instance the mapping of ‘friends’ and
‘foes’ on a worldwide scale (Fig. 1).
Set within the historical and intellectual context of classical
geopolitics, the Nordic countries have had their share of geopolit-
ical enfants terribles, be it Rudolf Kjellén in Sweden, Väinö Auer in
Finland or Gudmund Hatt in Denmark. Yet, with the notable
exception of Finnish geography, more recent Nordic geographers
have recoiled from engaging with geopolitical practices in and of
their own states. Here, like elsewhere, this absence is partly
explained by the dubious local and international legacies of
‘geopolitics’. As more generally suggested in Kristian Stokke and
Elin Sæther’s intervention, academic fashions and geographers’ role
in Nordic (welfare) state projects have additionally played a part. I
suspect, however, that this failure to engage with Nordic geopo-
litical practices also relates to a widespread if rarely explicated self-
image of being ‘victims’ rather than ‘perpetrators’ of geopolitics. Yet
geopolitical practices are not confined to powerful states. Indeed, as
Marcus Power and David Campbell (2010: 243) observe, the critical
scrutiny of geopolitical practices seems to diversify ‘away from the
hegemon (the US) and the greater powers to examine other states’.
To further this development, I will suggest that we should more
explicitly recognize a distinct e but certainly not autonomous e
small-state geopolitics, which I provisionally see as a situated
perspective on both the small-state ‘self’ and on the wider world.
What makes a ‘small-state’ should here be seen as the product of
geopolitical practices, which in their own right are worthy of crit-
ical scrutiny.
Small-state geopolitics is and should not be a purely ‘Nordic’
concern. Indeed, as has been suggested in the pages of Political
Geography, for instance, there has been a notable upsurge of papers
onwhat could be termed small-state geopolitical practices. But also
the Nordic countries provide intriguing sidelights on internation-
ally better-known geopolitical concerns. A small-state geopolitical
Fig. 1. A popular geopolitics of the ‘cartoon crisis’. (Caption: ‘Thus did the world receive the Mohamed-drawings: Dark green: they were published and defended. Faint green: first
published, then censured. Yellow: published, then unrest. Red: violence and boycott. Dark red: severe violence. Grey: neutral reaction.’) (Stjernfelt, 2010). For interpretation of the
references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.
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being small’. Focusing particularly on the pre-World War II period,
Katarina Schough (2008) interestingly suggests that Swedish
images of the world have been ordered around the essentially
geographical figure of thought known as the hyperboré (the
Hyperborean), a distinct variant of euro-centrism, which in various
ways posits Sweden and the Nordic area (but not the Sami people!)
as culturally superior and as a peaceful disseminator of culture. This
makes for ‘another form of expansionism. characterized by the
imagination of Swedish supremacy and expansion without military
support’ (Schough, 2008: 17). That such ‘peaceful’ forms of
expansion have relied on and aided the violence of greater powers
is usually conveniently forgotten. Just before World War II, Gud-
mund Hatt somewhat similarly argued that the Danish state had
long abandoned its great power pretentions. Yet the Danish people
had shown its vitality by expanding its Livsrum (living space)
through commercial (rather than territorial) geographical expan-
sion. Moreover, as a small-state geo-politician, he was clearly
uncomfortable with contemporaneous notions of geographical size
as a measure of strength. Shortly before Nazi Germany’s occupation
of Denmark, he warned:
One should guard oneself against counting so strongly on
quantity that one forgets quality. Small states can be strong, well
organized, full of life and leading in cultural development. Large
states can be unorganized, hopelessly full of contradictions,
weak and disposed to falling apart. (Quoted in Larsen, 2011: 44)
Indeed, as Durkheim reflects more generally, ‘societies can have
their pride, not in being the greatest or the wealthiest, but in being
the most just, the best organized and in possessing the best moral
constitution’ (quoted in Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006: 8).
Such visions of the Nordic countries as essentially peaceful and
qualitatively ‘superior’ actors in world politics have been reworked
and rearticulated in various ways. It is not by chance, I think, that
Nordic geographers mostly investigate world politics through len-
ses of ‘development’! Yet, as Schough (2008) argues, the figure of
the ostensibly peaceful hyperboré has always had militarism as its
dark, but usually bottled-up, Siamese twin.With thewaning of Cold
War politics, this figure is now raising its head in the Nordic
countries, which, having for long walked a geopolitical tightrope
between powerful neighbours as neutrals or as ‘allied with reser-
vations’ (Villaume, 1995), for the first time in generations havebecome warring states. The well-established Nordic foreign policy
instruments of trade, aid and peacekeepers are giving way to more
aggressive means, and this gives rise to new if still unsettled small-
state geopolitical imaginaries. It is little wonder that many Danes
experienced a burst of geopolitical vertigo at the eruption of the
‘cartoon crisis’!
These are but a few of the small-state geopolitical representa-
tions and practices of the past and the present in which Nordic
geographers ought to become more engaged. John Agnew (1994)
famously warns against the ‘territorial trap’. Discounting that
Agnew uses ‘territory’ in a somewhat narrow sense, as a synonym
for the state, this warning should also apply to analyses of small-
state geopolitics, and like my fellow interventionists, I see Nordic
political geography as part of a transnational, critical endeavour.
Yet, through our command of ‘obscure’ languages and histories,
Nordic geographers can e like other similarly situated geographers
e also take advantage of the territories in which we are entrapped
by birth, and we should not be afraid of mobilising our embedd-
edness analytically. Like Jouni Häkli (2003), I think that there is
a ‘market’ e no, a need e for ‘parochial’ political geographies, be
they ‘Nordic’ or otherwise.
Small states may be more than Kleinstaatengerümpel, ‘a rubbish
of small states’ (Parker, 1985: 186), as Nazi jargonwould have it. Yet
small is not necessarily beautiful, and also small-state geopolitics
must be subjected to critical scrutiny. The North and the Nordic
countries are by nomeans the only context inwhich to pursue such
an undertaking; but for ‘parochial’ Nordic as well as wider intel-
lectual and practical reasons, we need more work of this sort from
Nordic geographers.
Towards a topological view of Nordic political geography?
Richard Ek and Anders Lund Hansen
Is it meaningful to think about a “specific” or “unique” Nordic
political geography? Yes, absolutely! If you are into disciplinary
boundary setting and academic empire building it is. We do not
think that this is a rewarding course, however. Sure, we could
always come up with a working definition of Nordic political
geography for the record, perhaps something like: ‘The work and
publications of scholars regarding themselves as political geogra-
phers who are currently living and working in a Nordic country’.
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that, since such an act of framing always becomes problematic at
the next step: How should we define “Nordic”, “political”, or even
“geography”? Still, we find the issue interesting and even one in
which some debate is necessary. We would therefore like to make
some comments of a politico-epistemological and politico-
ontological character concerning the idea and imagination of
a “Nordic political geography”.
Politico-epistemologically, we argue that geography is an
intertextual body of knowledge work. This is hardly a controversial
stance in the light of the work conducted for decades now in the
sociology of science and the history of geographical thought. This
means that influences (from continental philosophy, just to
mention one example) have travelled and been transformed in the
networks of academic scholarship to such a degree that we could
never draw any lines of an epistemological character that would not
immediately shows flaws. All kinds of distinctions and boundaries
are after all arbitrary and open to re-negotiation (Ingold, 2007).
James Sidaway (2007) makes a similar point in his review of
Geography in America at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Gaile &
Willmott, 2005), where he argues that due to the entanglement
of American geography with geographers from elsewhere (not only
Anglophone geographers), the idea of “American geography” is
a problematic one.
The attempts to discuss “Nordic geography” are illustrative here.
The contribution by Kirsten Simonsen (2009) to The International
Encyclopedia of Human Geography shows the difficulties that exist in
the attempt to define “Nordic Geography” from a self/reflexive
point of view (see also Simonsen & Öhman, 2003). Surely, knowl-
edge production in geography departments and elsewhere is situ-
ational, so that place and political context matter, and it is
necessary to approach these things. We thus agree with the point
made by Kristian Stokke and Elin Sæther in their contribution that
contextual dynamics in the Nordic countries deserves some
attention from “political geographers”, and with Henrik Gutzon
Larsen’s call for critical scrutiny of Nordic small-state geopolitics.
But at the same time the designation “Nordic” should be used with
caution. “Nordic” identities are parts of intentionally constructed
discourses, and the word “Nordic” easily resonates with national-
istic and Romantic undercurrents, and so on. Furthermore,
geographical labels such as “Nordic” eradicate heterogeneity and
indicate a unity that seldom actually exists, as Sami Moisio elabo-
rates in more detail in his intervention.
But let us go back to Kirsten Simonsen’s attempt to handle the
limits and traps of geographically pinned down knowledge
production. The overview of Nordic Geography is presented as
a ‘map of an intellectual landscape.a narrative constructed by
a writer who is ambiguously positioned in the very field one is
trying to describe’ (Simonsen, 2009: 464). The review is then
unfolded in the form of certain dominant strands (Nordic economic
geography with regard to regional development, social and cultural
geography with regard to defraying the costs of the welfare state,
and German-inspired research into the history and materiality of
the rural landscape). When a territorial approach is applied, albeit
reluctantly, “Nordic geography” becomes in practice synonymous
with the most cited works and clusters of geographical research in
five countries.
We should be aware that the label “Nordic political geography”
might have some heuristic and pedagogical value. But this value
should never overshadow the limitations that are exposed and the
dangers that are potentially unfolded. As a label, “Nordic political
geography” delimits and excludes one form of ongoing knowledge
production. Labelling is in itself an ontological act of organization
that arrests, stabilizes and inherently simplifies (Chia, 1998). After
all, ‘Political geography is richest when reworked, resituated,redeployed, and re-imagined’ (Sidaway, 2008: 51), so that neat
classifications, whether based on spatial categories or not, are not
advisable. Furthermore, since classification is also a tool for
forgetting (Bowker & Star, 1999: 280, 281), we need to ask one
question that is very difficult to answer: what happens to research
that is not included as Nordic political geography? There is also the
moral problem of categorizing people, an act of ordering and
stratification that sometimes, probably more often than we would
like to admit, is used as a means of humiliation (Czarniawska,
2008): ‘this is not geography’, ‘this is not political geography’! We
have heard these comments many times, usually in statements
from established geographers directed towards Ph.D. students and
their dissertation projects.
Politico-ontologically, what we see here as the problem in the
approach towards disciplines and sub-disciplines as epistemolog-
ical practices that can be fitted into geographical categories is the
omnipresence of a topographical ontology. This is the same
ontology (or root metaphor, the mosaic, see Buttimer, 1993) that
underpins the territorial trap, a concept that amply catches the
effects of a topographical ontology and an issue towards which
political geographers, of course, should be extra sensitive (Agnew &
Corbridge, 1995). It is imagined that human geography can be
compartmentalized and juxtaposed to other academic disciplines
in the social sciences. Political geography then becomes a part of
human geography, and the question in this commentary section is
whether political geography can be further divided into a sub-sub-
discipline, “Nordic political geography”, an amalgamation of
geographical and thematic epistemological distinctions and
delimitations.
This ontological approach to the production of academic
research, the topographical approach, is inherently political since it
makes it possible to crystallize hierarchies and other sorts of
stratification. Some sub-disciplines come to be regarded as more
central than others, more established, more legitimate etc. while
some research is presented and represented as more central within
each sub-discipline. This ontological approach also points out the
importance of “finding” the “borders” of the sub/disciplines and
often of defending them, sometimes against the mavericks among
scholars who are “trying to get in”: This is not geography! It’s
philosophy! (We have heard that comment as well.). We could
extrapolate the consequences of this reasoning, applying a topo-
graphic approach towards the word and the world. It has “cleared
the way” for the relationships between geographical knowledge,
power and hegemony that have existed throughout the entire
history of the field of “geography”. We have seen it in the provision
of (absolute) spatial knowledge during the European “age of
discovery” in the 16th century, for instance (Livingstone, 1992), and
in modern nation-building projects such as Franco’s Spain
(Swyngedouw, 2007). We have seen it contribute to the sovereign
violence that is the effect of geographies of exception (Minca,
2007), and to the contemporary “cultural turn” in late-modern
warfare (Gregory, in press).
Although an orientation away from this topographical view of
disciplines inwhich the borders and characteristics of the sub-areas
of the academic landscape matter the most could be a good thing,
a topological approach to “Nordic political geography” as the work
and research of scholars in the Nordic countries and elsewhere
could also be fruitful. As we have learnt from the relational space
discussion, a topological ontology focuses on the properties of the
research and is not concerned with the topographical distribution
of research results or characteristics in a paradigmatic or discursive
sense (crystallising a core of research within a discipline as well as
a periphery of heretic scholarship). Any attempts to see a set of
disciplines, a discipline or a sub-discipline as a map or chart (for
instance “political geography” as a borderland between geography
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characterize the “nature” of specific research would be futile.
Rather, by taking a topological take on the social sciences as an
academic multidisciplinary practice that is folded and unfolded
(like Michel Serres & Bruno Latour’s (1995) example of the hand-
kerchief) in a constant intellectual becoming, research topics and
issues are co-constituted and “thrown together” in a multitude of
ways. Disciplinary belonging becomes secondary; instead it is the
character of the work (research design, style of writing, methods
used, ontological and epistemological starting points and so on) –
the main subjects investigated in a person’s publication portfolio –
that comes into focus. This implies that a Baltic sociologist’s work
on urban economic stratification could be closer (topologically, not
topographically speaking) to that of a Nordic political geographer
on the fate of public space in neoliberal times than the categories
and topography of academic work will allow us to perceive. When
all is said and done, to put energy into labels (whether geographical
labels or others such as “postmodernism” or the like) is not very
interesting or constructive.
Nevertheless, the intellectual process of relating to and musing
on the im/possibilities and in/appropriateness of an imagined
Nordic political geography can in itself be regarded as necessary
and fruitful. After all, it can be seen as a continuous act of boundary
definition that is a part of the subjectification of an academic and
intellectual identity at the individual as well as the community
level (Foucault, [1976] 1998). We agree with the concern expressed
over the dominance of Anglophone geography (Paasi, 2005) and
the contestation of the hegemonic Anglo-American “international”
knowledge production (Simonsen, 2004), but we do question first
whether it is particularly useful today to draw a hard line between
the dominant Anglo-American human geography and its non-
Anglo-American counterpart. Secondly, we question whether
there is any point in “fighting fire with fire”, that is, in creating
similar imagined communities of geographers to counterbalance
the Anglo-American one. The problematic step is making the
distinctions in the first place.
Finally, we agree that the objective should be to facilitate and
foster a multiplicity of spaces of critical Nordic (political) geogra-
phies e as has been the idea behind the International Critical
Geographers Group (ICGG). A continued multiscalar e “interna-
tional”e dialogue between politically interested scholars in human
geography is without question an endeavour that we encourage. An
intensified interlocution between “political geographers” in the
Nordic countries on the dangers and im/possibilities involved in the
emergence of a unified Nordic political geography should be part of
that ongoing dialogue.
End comment: Nordic identity and political geography
Elin Sæther and Kristian Stokke
This series of interventions has revolved around the question of
Nordic identity as a basis for a distinct Nordic political geography.
Focusing on forms of statehood, regional belonging and small-state
geopolitics, all four contributions share a critical stance on the
question of a common Nordic identity: We recognize its absence,
and in its place we find fluctuating boundaries, international
influences and contextual differences between the five Nordic
states. This position is articulated most strongly by Richard Ek and
Anders Lund Hansen, who argue that there cannot be any topo-
graphic basis for a separate Nordic political geography. The same
position is expressed in a more subtle way by Henrik Gutzon Larsen
in his warning against a Nordic territorial trap. Sharing these critical
concerns, Sami Moisio observes that the Nordic region is a discur-
sive construction that was born out of Cold War geopolitics and hasbeen used strategically by diverse actors to gain and maintain
political legitimacy in national and international affairs. In our own
intervention we similarly argue that the so-called Nordic model of
statehood does not constitute a common ground for a regional
identity and political geography. This means that all four interven-
tions share the position that there is no ontologically stable basis for
a separate Nordic political geography. Nordic identity, like all
identities, is a discursively constructed imagined community rather
than a fixed collectivity with a given essence and clear boundaries.
Still, as all the interventions also show, we find it interesting as
political geographers to reflect on our regional identity and espe-
cially discuss its impacts on our research practices. Research is
always and unavoidably situated with regard to multiple subject
positions. Although the Nordic identity lacks in essence, our work
as geographers still contain, as Haraway (1996: 123) says “views
from somewhere”, also in a geographic sense. As unstable and
heterogeneous as the Nordic identity seems to insiders like us,
there is nevertheless a regional positionality that affects our
political geographic research practices alongside other dimensions
of situatedness.
Reflections on positionality in academia display a certain bifur-
cation between the view that awareness and openness about the
researcher’s positionality can reduce its negative impacts, and the
view that situatedness can be a resource and strategy for knowledge
production. The latter position can be illustrated with reference to
our identity as political geographers: While we admit the futility of
disciplinary boundary-keeping, as demonstrated by Richard Ek and
Anders Lund Hansen in their intervention, we identify with the
term political geography and use this label with a purpose, as a form
of strategic essentialism. Likewise, wemay seek to utilize ourNordic
positionality in a strategic manner to bring forth contextual themes
and perspectives that can enrich political geographic research and
debates, and also challenge tendencies towards assumed univer-
salism within the Anglo-American mainstream.
The four interventions point towards issues that become
apparent when the Nordic regional positionality meets our identity
as political geographers. Henrik Gutzon Larsen thus draws atten-
tion to small-state geopolitics and the tacit geopolitical assump-
tions guiding Nordic foreign policies, in order to make a plea for
‘parochial’ political geographies. Our own intervention observes
that there are a number of political geographic research themes
that emanate from the diversity and transformation of the so-called
Nordic model of statehood and calls for critical political geographic
research on contextual political dynamics. Along similar lines, Sami
Moisio highlights the diversity of political processes behind Nordic
social democracies, welfare states and mixed economies. Richard
Ek and Anders Lund Hansen argue that the use of the “Nordic” label
is itself a purposeful discursive practice that has stabilizing,
simplifying and depoliticising effects. These and other examples
indicate that there is a basis for more active contributions from
Nordic political geographers to knowledge production and debates
in international political geography. All the contributors see this as
a matter of critical engagement with contextual processes of power
and politics. Hence, we do not see the construction and reification
of Nordic identity as a necessary precondition or fruitful strategy
for the further development of critical Nordic political geography.
Rather we have sought to demonstrate that understanding the
political dynamics associated with the label “Nordic” is the only
precondition for the development of political geographies inspired
by the Nordic context.
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